Lis Pendens by Laurence, Robert
North Dakota Law Review 




Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Laurence, Robert (1979) "Lis Pendens," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 56 : No. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol56/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 




Generally speaking, it is the parties before the court that are
bound by a judgment rendered in litigation. The doctrine of lis
pendens, in both its common-law and statutory forms, represents
an extension of that rule of res judicata to persons not before the
court. The theory is easy: litigation, either by its own force under
the common law or through a statutory notification procedure, puts
potential purchasers or encumbrancers of property on notice, and
that notice binds them to the judgment rendered. The lis pendens
theory also makes eminent sense, for otherwise there would be an
exception to res judicata nearly large enough to swallow the
venerable rule.
This sensible and easily mastered theory becomes somewhat
more difficult when its details are explored. This article attempts to
examine and systematize those details, thereby smoothing the way
for the litigant (or, more likely, his attorney) who wishes to afford
his judgment the maximum protection.
II. THE COMMON-LAW DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS
AND ITS VIABILITY IN NORTH DAKOTA
The common-law doctrine of lis pendens, embodied in the
maxim pendente lite nihil innovetur,1 bound a purchaser of property to
the results of any lawsuit, pending at the time of purchase, in which
the property acquired was the precise subject matter of the suit.2
*Assistant Professor of Law. University of North Dakota:J.D.. Universitv of New Mexico.
1. "Nothing should be changed during the pendency of an action." BAt tENTtNF'S lAW Dic-
TIONARY 930 (3d ed. 1969).
2. General treatments of is pendens are rare. One of the best appears to be I A. FREEMAN, A
TREATISE ON TIlE IAW OFJt'DGMENTS §§ 519-45 (5th ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as FRE MAN]. See also
8 G. TiowPsoN. COMtMENTARI.S ON THE. MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 5 4308 (1963 & Supp.
1979).
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The doctrine was a harsh one, because it required neither actual
nor record notice be given to the purchaser. It has been
alternatively justified on the basis of constructive notice and public
policy considerations. 3 The purpose of the doctrine is said to be the
stabilization of titles, 4 but it is clear that another purpose is the
termination of legal controversies, 5 and hence it is related to the
doctrine of resjudicata.6 Without a doctrine such as lis pendens, a
litigant, fearful of losing in a suit respecting property, might convey
that property to a bona fide purchaser and send the plaintiff looking
for a new defendant.
The common-law rule was indeed harsh, and hence was not
construed broadly. 7 It applied only when particular property,
adequately described, was the subject matter of the suit, and it
bound only those persons who purchased 8 the property from one of
the parties to the suit during its pendency, or those persons
claiming through such a purchaser. It did not bind a person pur-
chasing from a third party who was not a litigant or privy to a
litigant, because in that case the litigants would be strangers to that
third-party's title. 9
The common-law doctrine of lis pendens appears never to
have been applied by a North Dakota appellate court, and its
viability in North Dakota is lessened by section 28-05-07 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which provides that a civil litigant in
an action affecting the title to real property may record a notice that
the action is pending and that "[qrom the time of filing only shall
the pendency of the action be constructive notice to a purchaser or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby." 10 Whether the
3. Munger v. T..J. Beard & Bros.. 79 Neb. 764. 113 N.W. 214 (1907). "The rule that a pen-
dente lite purchaser took title to property involved in litigation. suit ject to the judgment finally en-
tered, was adopted out of considerations of public policy and to inspire confidence in titles hased
upon the judgment or decree ofcourt." Id. at 769-70. 113 N.W. at 216. See alto Wendv's of South
.Jersey, Inc.. v. Blanchard Mgt. Corp., 170 N.J. Super. 491, 406 A.2d 1337 (1979).
4. E & E Hauling, Inc. v. DuPage County, 77 11. App. 3d 1017, 396 N.E.2d 1260 (1979);
LaMarchev. Rosenblum. 50A.D.2d 636, __ , 374 N.Y.S.2d 443. 445 (1975).
5. Ravitch v. Stollman Poultry Farms. Inc.. 162 Conn. 26. -. 291 A.2d 213, 218 (1971):
Brown v. Semrple. 204 So. 2d 229. 233 (Fla. 1967): Taylor v. Lanahan. 73 III. App- 3d 829. 392
N.E.2d 425 (1979).
6. "The general rule is, that one not a party to a suit is not affected by the.judgmnt: the vx-
ception at common law is. that a pendente life purchaser, though not a party. was so affecd ....
Richardson v. White. 18 Cal. 103. 107 (1861): see alo Page v. W.W. Chase Co., 145 Cal. 578.79 P.
278 (1904).
7. Picerne v. Redd. 72 R.l. 4, _ 47 A.2d 906. 910 (1946): Colt v. Cole. 117 Vt- 354. __ .
91 A.2d 819. 823 (1952).
8. Encumbrancers pendente lite are treated as purchasers. See Stout V. lye, 103 U.S. 66. 69
(1880): General Petroleum Corp. v. Dougherty. 117 F.2d 529. 538 (9th Cir. 1941).
9. Petty v. Hall. 257 Ala. 145. _, 57 So. 2d 620, 621 (1952): Ross v. Title (tuar. & Trust
Co.. 136 Cal. App. 393. 399. 29 P.2d 236. 240 (1934): Eich v- Czervonko. 330 I1. 455. 461-62. 161
N.E. 864. 867. cert. denied, 278 U.S. 642 (1928).
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (1974) (emphasis added). Section 28-05-07. which will he in-
spected in detail in Part Ill, infra, provides:
Lis PENDENS 329
enactment of this statute abolished the common-law doctrine is an
issue worthy of discussion. This issue, undecided in North Dakota,
has been the subject of judicial thought in other jurisdictions. The
most recent case holding that the common-law doctrine survives the
enactment of a lis pendens statute is Central Trust Co. v. Harless,"t a
1930 West Virginia case. In that case, the Breedloves took their
deed from Stone during the pendency of an ejectment suit by
Kennard against Stone and others. The court held that, "[w]hile
we have a statute[1 2 ] . . . requiring the filing of lis pendens, it
applies only to suits to charge real estate with debts, and not to suits
to recover it. . . . Hence, in suits in ejectment the common law
doctrine of lis pendens applies. "13
North Dakota's lis pendens statute is applicable "[in a civil
action in a district court affecting the title to real property," 14 while
West Virginia's is applicable in "a suit . . . to enforce any lien
upon, right to or interest in designated real estate. 15 To the
extent that an action might "affect the title" without "enforcing a
lien, right or interest," it is arguable that there is less of the corn-
In a civil action in a district court affecting the title to real property, the plaintiff, at the
time of filing the complaint or at any time afterwards. or the defendant, when he sets
up in his answer an affirmative cause of action affecting the title to real property and
demands suhstantive relief, at the time of filing his answer or at any time afterwards.
may file for record with the register ofdeeds of each county in which the real property
is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties,
the object ofthe action, and a description of the real property affected. From the time
of filing only shall the pendency of the action he constructive notice to a purchaser or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, and every person whose conveyance or
encumbrance is subsequently executed or subsequently recorded shall be deemed a
suhsequent purchaser or encumbrancer with notice and shall be bound by all
proceedings taken after the filing of such notice to the saule extent as if he were a parts
to the action. For the purpose of his [sic] section, an at'tion shall be deemed to be pen-
cling from the time of filing such notice but such notice shall be of no avail unless it
shall be followed by the first publication of the summons, or hy the personal service
thereofon a defendant, within sixty dass after such filing.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (1974).
11. 108 W. Va. 618. 152 S.F. 209 (1930). This case is the latest (last?) in i line of West Virginia
cases heginning with Rardin v. Rardin, 85 W. V'a. 145. 102 S.E. 295 (1919). Rardin is annotated.
and other cases with similar holdings are collected, at 10 A.L.R. 306 (1921). See also Hammerslv v.
District Court, __ Colo. - 610 P.2d 94 (1980), in which the Supreme Court of Colorado
discussed the relation between the common law and Colorado's lis pendens rule.
12. The citation to the West Virginia Code is omitted. The section at issue is now codified as
section 55-I 1-2 of the West Virginia Code, and provides. in part:
Whenever any person shall commence a suit.... to enforce any lien upon, right to. o
interest in designated real estate, the pendency of such suit ... shall not operate as
cmnstructive notice thereof to any pendente lite purchaser or encumbrancer of such
real estate for a valuable consideration and without notice. until such person shall fit'
for recordation .. a memorandum ... of the pendency ofsuch suit.
W. V.A. Cooe § 55-11-2 (1966).
13. Central Trust Co. v. Harless. 108 W. Va. 618. _ . 152 S.E. 209. 211 (1930) (citation
omited). North Dakota has no cause of action in ejectment: its equivalent. quiet title, is covered b'
statutory lis pendens. See infra note 26.
14. N.D. CENT. ConE § 28-05-07 (1974). Seesupra note 10 for full text of the section.
15. W. Vs. CoiF 55-1 1-2 (1966). See supra note 12 for text of the section.
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mon law left uncovered by the North Dakota statute than by West
Virginia's. Nevertheless, there are, in both states, some aspects of
the common-law doctrine not expressly pre-empted by the statute,
and perhaps, as in Harless, the common law remains in effect, to
that extent, in North Dakota.
A California case, however, suggests otherwise. In MacDermot
v. Hayes,16 Smith purchased, for value, some shares of stock,
without notice that an action was pending at the time to impress the
stock with a constructive trust running from the defendant to the
plaintiff. California had a lis pendens statute substantially similar
to North Dakota's, similarly restricted to actions affecting realty.
Discussing whether the statute affected the common-law doctrine in
actions involving personalty, the California Supreme Court noted:
It appears to be the established rule that, where a lis
pendens statute has no negative words or repealing
clause, it is to be "regarded as supplemental to the com-
mon law and not as repealing it, so that the common law
will govern in all cases not covered by the statute. "17
After speculating on the harshness of the rule as applied to per-
sonalty, however, the court concluded that an earlier statute had
completely abolished the common-law doctrine, which then had
been reinstated by the lis nendens statute, but only to the extent
specifically delineated in the statute. Hence the court reasoned that
the doctrine did not apply to personalty, and Smith was not bound
by the outcome of the suit."
North Dakota has no statute such as that used by the court in
MacDermot to abolish the common-law doctrine,t 9 but North
16. 175 Cal. 95,170P. 616(1917).
17. MacDermot v. Haves, 175 Cal. 95. 109. 170 P. 616.621 (1917)(citation omitted).
18. Id. at 110, 170 P. at 622. The court cited subdivision 2 of section 1908 of the California
Civil Procedure Code, which remains substantially the same to date and is set out in note 19. infra.
19. The California statute provides, in relevant part:
The effect ofa judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a court
or judge of this state, or of the United States. having jurisdiction to pronoun(e the
judgment or order, is as follows:
(I) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a decedent, or in respect to the
personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment
or order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will. or administration. or the
condition or relation of the person.
(2) In other cases, the judgment or order is, in respect to the matter directly ad-
judged, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title sub-
sequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing tinder the same title and in the same capacity, provided thev have notice.
actual or constructive, of the pendency of the action or proceeding.
CAL. ConE CtV. PROC. S 1908 (West Supp. 1979).
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Dakota does have a general statute abolishing the common law,
which provides that "[in this state there is no common law in any
case where the law is declared by the code. "20 Elsewhere, the North
Dakota Century Code provides:
The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be construed strictly has no ap-
plication to this code. The code establishes the law of this
state respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its
provisions and all proceedings under it are to be con-
strued liberally, with a view to effecting its objects and to
promoting justice. 
21
When read in light of the first-quoted statute, the word "only" in
the lis pendens statute might be construed as abolishing the com-
mon-law doctrine. The latter-quoted section gives weight to
arguments, such as those made in MacDermot, that lis pendens
works hardships on relatively innocent parties and should therefore
be limited in its application. 22 That is to say, it would be consistent
both with the abolition of the common law and with the common-
law doctrine itself to find that common-law lis pendens has been
abolished in North Dakota, except to the extent that it was precisely
reinacted via section 28-05-07.
The question, it should be noted, is of more than historic,
academic interest. For example, it has been held, although it is by
no means settled, that the common-law doctrine applies to actions
for specific personal property, as well as specific real property.
23
This section appears to have been misapplied in MacDermot and its predecessor, Page v. W.W.
Chase Co., 145 Cal. 578, 79 P. 278 (1904). Subsection 1, which applies to judgments "against a
specific thing," would seem to govern cases in which lis pendens is appropriate, and the subsection
seems entirely consistent with the common-law doctrine. Subsection 2, governing "other cases"
(for example, cases in which specific property is not at issue and where lis pendens would not be ap-
propriate), contains the following language, which the court held had repealed the doctrine:
"provided they have notice, actual or constructive, of the pendency of the action or proceeding."
Regarding this, the MacDermot court stated:
[These words], of course, cannot refer to the constructive notice which at common law
was imputed to all persons from the fact that an action was begun, for if that was its
meaning the proviso would be without any force whatever as to actual notice, since the
action would always be constructive notice and all persons would be concluded [sic]
whether they had actual notice or not.
175 Cal. at 110. 170 P. at 622.
20. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 1-01-06 (1975).
21. N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-01 (1975).
22. 175 Cal. at 110, 170 P. at 622.
23. P.A. Stark Piano Co. v. Fannin, - Ky. 279 S.W. 108U, 1081 (1926)
(common-law lis pendens recognized as "applicable to all kinds of personal property" excepting
negotiable instruments and certain "articles of ordinary commerce, sued in the usual way"); Carr v.
Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. 149, 8 S.W. 907 (1888) ("The doctrine of is pendens applies to every
description of property, whether real or personal. ").
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Thus, at common law a suit for the specific performance of a con-
tract for the sale of an automobile arguably puts all potential pur-
chasers and encumbrancers of the car on notice of the pending
litigation and binds them to the judgment. It should be emphasized
that such a result, while not expressly ruled out by statute or case
law, is unlikely in North Dakota.
III. STATUTORY NOTIFICATION OF LIS PENDENS
Section 28-05-07 of the North Dakota Century Code2 4 permits
a plaintiff to file notice of the pendency of his or her suit. This puts
all subsequent purchasers on constructive notice of the suit. This
relief is available only in certain actions and only with respect to
certain property. We now turn to an inspection of those statutory
requirements.
A. WHAT ACTIONS?
Section 28-05-07 permits the filing of notice of lis pendens in
"a civil action in a district court affecting the title to real
property. "25 The most obvious of such actions, and the one in
which lis pendens is most likely to be used, is an action to quiet title
under chapter 32-17 of the North Dakota Century Code. 26 Other
24. This statute will be the principal focus of this article. See supra note 1(0 for the text of this
statute. Also of interest is the following United States Code section, which concerns constructive
notice of pending actions:
Where the law of a State requires a notice of an action concerning real property pen-
ding in a court of the State to be registered, recorded, docketed, or indexed in a par-
ticular manner, or in a certain office or county or parish in order to give constructivc
notice of the action as it relates to the real property, and such law authorizes a notice of
an action concerning real property pending in a United States district court to he
registered, recorded, docketed, or indexed in the same manner, or in the same place,
those requirements of the State law must be complied with in order to give con-
structive notice of such an action pending in a United States district court as it relats
to real property in such state.
28 U.S.C. § 1964(1976).
The North Dakota lis pendens statute does not specifically authorize the notice of the pendency
of a suit in federal court, and thus might not be incorporated into federal law by section 1964. But see
Daniels v. Universal Inv. Corp., 355 F. Supp. 693 (D.P.R. 1972), in which a similar Puerto Rico
statute was held incorporated. See also Batey v. Digirolamo, 418 F. Supp. 695 (D. Hawaii 1976),
discussed infra at notes 162-70 and accompanying text. See also Winkler v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 707
(10th Cir. 1980).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-05-07 (1974).
26. Section 32-17-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
An action may be maintained by any person having an estate or an interest in, or lien
or encumbrance. upon, real property, whether in or out of possession thereof and
whether such property is vacant or unoccupied, against any person claiming an estate
or interest in. or lien or encumbrance upon, the same, for the purpose of determining
such adverse estate, interest, lien or encumbrance.
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actions which fairly clearly "affect the title to real property," and
in which the statute allows the filing of lis pendens, are eminent
domain,2 7 actions to partition realty 2 8 divorce actions 29 and will
probates 30 where specific real property is at issue, suits for specific
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-17-01 (1976).
The fact that in North Dakota the common-law action ofejectment is subsumed in the statutory
action of quiet title makes an interesting question moot in this state. See Udgaard v. Schindler, 75
N.D. 625, 31 N.W.2d 776 (1948); Burke v. Scharf, 19 N.D. 227, 124 N.W. 79 (1909); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-17-02 (1976). E jectment is essentially an action to recover the possession of real property,
yet it generally requires that plaintiff recover on the strength of his own title, and theJus teriii defense
is permitted. For a venerable case which states this general rule, although holding otherwise, see
Tapscott v. Cobbs, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 172 (1854). Hence, while ejectment to recover possession does
not appear to be an action 'affecting the title to real estate," it does require that title be tried, and res
judicata might support the filing of lis pendens. See Central Trust Co. v. Harless, supra note 11, in which
the common-law doctrine was applied to an action in eectment.
Further restricting the application of lis pendens in quiet title actions against possessors is
section 32-17-17 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides that "faIn action for the
recovery of real property against a person in possession cannot be prejudiced by any alienation made
by such person either before or after the commencement of the action." N.D. CENT. COnF § 32-17-
17 (1976). Thus, when quiet title is used to eiect a possessor, the filing of lis pendens notice by the
plaintiff would appear to be superfluous.
For a case involving an action to enjoin the use of realty where defendant alleges an easement,
see Taylor v. Lanahan, 73 111. App. 3d 829, 392 N. E.2d 425 (1979).
27. The North Dakota Century Code section pertaining to eminent domain provides, in part,
that "[al copy of the order must be filed in the office of the register of deeds of the county and
thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the plaintiff for the purpose therein specified."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-27 (1976). Hence, the title to real property is affected. Secion 14 of article
1 of the North Dakota Constitution makes it clear that eminent domain is a civil action brought in
district court. N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 14. The "plaintiff" referred to in section 28-05-07 is defined, for
eminent domain purposes, in section 32-15-18 (1).
Federal condemnation suits are governed by rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FED. R. Civ. P. 71A. No lis pendens filing requirements are contained in that statute. It appears.
however, that the United States routinely files a notice oflis pendens under the North Dakota statute
in condemnation suits.
With respect to suits to enforce zoning ordinances, see E & E Hauling, Inc., v. DuPage County,
77 111. App. 3d 1017, 396 N.E.2d 1260(1979).
28. See chapter 32-16 of the North Dakota Century Code, which governs only the partition of
realty, although the partition of personalty is permitted in the same action. This chapter contains its
own lis pendens provision, section 32-16-04, which is mandatory rather than permissive, in contrast
to section 28-05-07. The statute does not specify the penalty for failing to record, and no case has
addressed the question. Section 32-16-04 was derived, however, from section 755 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure, which was repealed in 1976. Its replacement, section 872.250 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, provides for a stay of proceedings until lis pendens is filed. CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE § 872.250 (West Supp. 1979). Cases under the now-repealed section generally
construe the word "must" as "may." See, e.g., Rutledge v. Rutledge, 119 Cal. App. 2d 114, -,
259 P.2d 79, 82 (1953), in which the court stated that "[these are merely directory and in the
absence ofa showing ofprejudice will not vitiate a decree."
29. Section 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code gives the district court the authority to
distribute real property from one spouse to another, thereby "affecting the title to real property."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1971). Similar is section 14-06-03, with respect to separation from bed
and board. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-06-03 (1971).
It should be noted that lis pendens will protect the prevailing spouse against pendente lite
purchasers only if the divorce decree directs the conveyance of the specific property described in the
lis pendens notice. Cf Atlas Garage & Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hurley, 167 Conn. 248, 355 A.2d
286 (1974). In Atlas, Mrs. Hurley attached her husband's property, but did not file lis pendens
against it. Plaintiff subsequently recovered judgment against the husband and filed a judgment lien.
Mrs. Hurley eventually obtained a divorce decree awarding her the real property and one dollar per
year alimony. The court held that only the alimony award was secured by the attachment lien, and
Mrs. Hurley took the realty subject to plaintiff's judgment lien. Id. at-., 355 A.2d at 291.
The attachment statute applied in Atlas specifically stated that the recordation'of attachment did
not constitute the filing of lis pendens. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-285 (West Supp. 1979). The
North Dakota statute which allows the prejudgment attachment of realty contains no such disclaimer
and may serve as notice oflis pendens. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08.1-09 (Supp. 1979). Apparenty the
attachment remedy is available only when plaintiff is making a money demand, rather than seeking
to "affect title." Seee.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 5§ 32-08.1-02,-03 (Supp. 1979).
30. Technically the purported will itself, and not the real property devised, is the res of a will
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performance of a use covenant of a contract for the sale of land,"'
contest, and the argument has been made on this ground that notice oflis pendens is not required in
such a case. Courts have generally rejected this argument, however, looking beyond the form to the
substance of the action. See, e.g., Catholic Univ. v. Boyd, 227 Il1. 281, 81 N.E. 363 (1907);
Whitehurst v. Abbott, 225 N.C. 1, 33 S.E.2d 129 (1945); see also cases cited at 159 A.L.R. 386
(1945). Hence, the probate of a will should be considered "a civil action in a district court affecting
the title to real property," and section 28-05-07 should apply to allow notice to be filed to protect the
claimants against pendente lite purchasers or encumbrancers.
Section 30.1-20-10 of the North Dakota Century Code, which is North Dakota's codification of
section 3-910 of the Uniform Probate Code, appears inconsistent with that conclusion. That section
provides:
If property . . . is acquired for value by a purchaser from . . . a distributee who has
received an instrument or deed of distribution from the personal representative, or is
so acquired by a purchaser from . . . a transferee of the distributee, the purchaser or
lender takes title free of any right of an interested person in the estate and incurs no
personal liability to the estate, or to any interested person. whether or not the
distribution was proper or supported by court order or the authority of the personal
representative was terminated before execution of the instrument or deed .... To be
protected under this provision, a purchaser or lender need not inquire whether a
personal representative acted properly in making the distribution in kind, even if the
personal representative and the distributee are the same person, or whether the
authority of the personal representative had terminated before the distribution.
N. D. CENT. COnE 5 30.1-20-10 (Supp. 1979) [U.P.C. § 3-9101. It therefore appears that a purchaser
pendente lite from a distributee with a deed of distribution will prevail even when the distributee/seller
loses in the will contest. Section 30.1-20-10, the more recent of the two conflicting statutes and the
one which is part of a detailed statutory plan, should arguably prevail and work a partial implied
repeal of section 28-05-07. See Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied.Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39. 45 (N.D.
1974). See aLvo 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03. at 300 (4th ed. 1973). The
winning contestants, deprived of any protection against the purchasers, have an action against the
selltr. See N.D. CENT. CODE §. 30.1-20-09 (1976) [U.P.C. S 3-909]. There may also be an action
against the personal representative for breach of trust. See N.D. CENT. CORE 5 30.1-18-03 (1976)
JU.P.C. 53-7031.
The conflict between the Probate Code and the lis pendens statute is less clear, however, when
there have been no probate proceedings and no deeds of distribution. Section 30.1-12-08 provides as
follows:
No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment
proceeding . . . may be commenced more than three years after the decedent's death,
except:
1. If a previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt about the fact
of the decedent's death ....
2. Appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be
maintained in relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared, or missing
person for whose estate a conservator has been appointed, at any time within
three years after the conservator becomes able to establish the death of the
protected person.
3. A proceeding to contest an informally probated will . . . may be
commenced within the later of twelve months from the informal probate or
three years from the decedent's death.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-12-08 (1976) [U.P.C. § 3-108].
Hence, three years after the decedent's death a purchaser can feel reasonably comfortable
dealing with the intestate heir of the decedent. This is true, of course, only if none of the tolling
situations enumerated in -section 30.1-12-08 occur. A contest of an informally probated will,
provided for in subsection (3), presents a situation of particular interest. It appears that the litigants
in that contest must invoke section 28-05-07 to protect themselves against purchasers pendente lite who
purchase from the supposed intestate heir after the three years has expired. Otherwise, such
purchasers would be required to be aware of the tolling events where no notice had ever been filed.
In conclusion, a possible accomodation between the lis pendens statute and the Probate Code
might be this: For three years following the decedent's death, will contestants would not be permitted
to file under section 28-05-07, and purchasers from persons holding deeds of distribution would be
protected regardless of the outcome of the contest. During this period, purchasers from persons with
no deed ofdistribution would be acting at their own peril, because their seller would be a stranger to
the title. After the three-year period, will contestants should be required to comply with section 28-
05-07 in order to protect themselves against pendente lite purchasers.
31. Specific performance in North Dakota is governed by chapter 32-04 of the North Dakota
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actions to set aside a conveyance of land as fraudulent,3 2 and suits
to impose an implied trust on specific real estate.
33
The foreclosure of a mortgage or lien on real property would
seem unquestionably to be an action which affects title, 34 and
therefore one in which lis pendens notice must be filed to protect
the plaintiff. Section 28-05-09 of the North Dakota Century Code,
however, makes it statutorily clear that notice need not be filed for
actions foreclosing mortgages or for the enforcement of mechanic's
or miner's liens.
35
Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-04 (1976). Section 32-04-04 makes it clear that title is
affected in a suit to recover real property by specific performance. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-04
(1976). Seealso Hammersly v. District Court,__ Colo. __ , 610 P.2d 94(1980). Section 32-04-16,
which protects a bona fide purchaser from specific performance of his vendor's prior contract, seems
consistent with section 28-05-07. Filing fis pendens under the latter statute would put any purchaser
on notice of the lawsuit and, afortiori, of plaintiff's contract. In such a case, the purchaser pendente lite
would not be bona fide and section 32-04-16 would not apply.
A related question concerns the cancellation of a contract for the sale of land. See N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 32-18 (1976). In the case of default, a land contract may be terminated without court
proceedings upon the giving of notice to the defaulter. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-18-02 (1976).
Therefore lis pendens would not be needed, there being no pending litigation. See also N.D. CENT.
CODE 5 32-18-05 (1976) (recordation requirements in the case of contracts which have been
recorded).
The putative'defaulter, however, may by affidavit claim a defense or counterclaim against the
canceller in district court and seek an injunction against cancellation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-06
(1976). Thereafter, all proceedings for cancellation are in the district court, and such proceedings
should probably be called an action affecting title and be treated as in a suit for specific performance.
discussed above.
32. The North Dakota version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act is codified at
chapter 13-02 of the North Dakota Century Code. Sections 13-02-09 (regarding creditors whose
claims have matured) and 13-02-10 (regarding those whose claims have not matured) permit the
plaintiffto set aside a conveyance of property which was fraudulent under the Act. N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 13-02-09, -10 (1971). In the case of real property this setting aside would "affect the title," and
therefore a notice oflis pendens might appropriately be filed. See 74 A.L.R. 690 (1931).
33. Implied trusts are discussed in section 59-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code and are
of two types, resulting and constructive. See Scheid v. Scheid, 239 N.W.2d 833, 837 (N.D. 1976).
That the judicial imposition of a resulting trust "affects the title to real property" is evidenced in
Schrank v. Meade, 145 N.W.2d 514 (N.D. 1966), in which the supreme court affirmed the lower
court decision vesting a fee title in the plaintiffs and ordering a partition sale. In Schrank, the
defendant had argued that he owned the property by gift from the decedent, while plaintiffs claimed
through decedent's will. Id. at 516.
The imposition of a constructive trust likewise affects the title to real property. In Scheid, plaintiff
sought imposition of a constructive trust, alleging that defendant had acquired his interest in the
property by mistake. The trial court agreed, imposed the constructive trust, and then quieted title in
the plaintiff. The supreme court affirmed. 239 N.W.2d at 842. For a case in which the recording of
lis pendens notice was found appropriate in a suit seeking imposition of a constructive trust, see
Grossfeld v. Beck, 42 A.D.2d 344, 346 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1973). Regarding implied trusts, see Note,
Implied Trusts in North Dakota, 29 N.D.L. REV. 58 (1953).
34. See, e.g., Buxton v. Sargent, 7 N.D. 503, 75 N.W. 811 (1898) (lis pendens notice recorded in
a suit to enforce a vendor's lien); accord, Neffv. Elder, 84 Ark. 277, 105 S.W. 260 (1907); Raben v.
Overseas Barters, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 613, 286 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1967); American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Wilds, 545 S.W.2d 749 (Tenn. 1976); Wees v. Hymes, 132 W. Va. 301, 51 S.E.2d 792
(1949). But of Rehnberg v. Minnesota Homes, Inc., 236 Minn. 230, 52 N.W.2d 454 (1952), which
involved the recognition of an equitable lien on realty. The Minnesota lis pendens statute there in
issue applies to "all actions in which the title to, or any interest in or lien upon, real property is
involved or affected, or is brought in question." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 557.02 (West Supp. 1979). The
court held that "[nlo issue arises as to the title. Plaintiff admits that the title to the real estate, and
any and all interest therein, is owned by the corporation. The filing of the notice oflis pendens can be
justified, if at all, only on the theory of an equitable lien." 236 Minn. at 234, 52 N.W.2d at 456.
Equitable liens are discussed infra at notes 47-49.
35. "No notice of the pendency ofan action in a district court shall be required if the action is for
the foreclosure of a mortgage or for the enforcement of a mechanic's lien or miner's lien." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-05-09 (1974). The statutes creating the excepted actions are consistent with this.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Mortgage foreclosures and mechanic's and miner's liens,
mentioned in section 28-05-09, are not all of the liens recognized in
North Dakota which might attach to realty. Most of the statutory
liens listed in title 35 of the North Dakota Century Code and
elsewhere throughout the Code specifically attach only to
personalty. 36 The foreclosure of such a lien would not be an action
affecting title to realty, and the filing of lis pendens under the
statute would not be appropriate.
There are, however, certain statutory liens which may attach
to realty: the real property vendor's lien,3 7 the real property
purchaser's lien, 38 the well or pipeline construction lien, 39 and the
house mover's lien.4 0 The first two of these statutory liens may not
be enforced against a subsequent good faith purchaser for value,
apparently including a pendente lite purchaser.4 1 Hence, section 28-
05-07 of the North Dakota Century Code allows only foreclosing
construction or house mover lienors to file and protect themselves
against purchasers during the pendency of the foreclosure suit.
The attorney's lien deserves special mention. That lien
attaches to papers, money, or money due the client, and secures
payment of the attorney's fee .4 1 The word "money," When found
in similar statutes of other states, has been read broadly so as to
include realty owned by the client as a result of a judgment
obtained by the attorney. 43 For our purposes, the sequence might
be as follows: Attorney is engaged by Client, who is seeking to quiet
title to Blackacre in himself. Judgment is for Client, who then
refuses to pay Attorney. Attorney is entitled to a statutory lien in
the judgment, which in this case is essentially specific realty. The
Section 32-19-39, for example, provides that "falll orders, judgments, or decrees entered in any
action [foreclosing a real estate mortgage] shall be binding upon . . . all those claiming by, through,
or under [a named defendant] after the commencement of the action." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-39
(1976). Similar are sections 35-27-24 and 35-27-25, with respect to mechanic's liens, and section 35-
15-06 with respect to miner's liens. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-15-06, 35-27-24, -25 (1980).
36. Several liens, for example, attach only to crops. See North Dakota Century Code chapters
35-07 (Threshing Lien), 35-08 (Crop Production Lien), 35-09 (Fertilizer, Farm Chemicals and Seed
Lien), 35-10 (Sugar Beet Production Lien), and 35-11 (Farm Laborer's Lien). N.D. CENT. CODE
chs. 35-07 to -11 (1980). Cultivated crops are personalty. See 25 C.J.S. Crops S 4 (1966). Other liens
attach only to personalty. See, e.g., the repairman's lien, which attaches only to an "automobile,
truck, engine, combine, tractor, farm equipment, well machine, or aircraft." N.D. CENT. CODE
35-13-01 (1980).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 35-20-01, -02 (1980).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-20-03 (1980).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 35-24 (1980). Section 35-24-03(1) attaches the well or pipeline
construction lien to the oil or gas leasehold. The extent to which such a leasehold is realty will be
discussed infra at notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-20-12 to -14 (1980).
41. "The liens defined in sections 35-20-01 and 35-20-03 are subject to the rights of subsequent
creditors without notice, and of purchasers and encumbrancers in good faith and for value." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 35-20-04 (1980).
42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-20-08 (1980). See Hospital Serv., Inc. v. Knutson, 246 N.W.2d 754
(N.D. 1976).
43. Tuttle v. Wyman, 149 Neb. 769, 780. 32 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1948).
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lien may be recorded in the judgment docket. 44 In an action by
Attorney against Client to foreclose the lien, Attorney must file a
notice of lis pendens under section 28-05-07 in order to protect
herself against pendente lite purchasers of Blackacre. 45 Attorney is
entitled to file the notice because the foreclosure of her lien
"affects the title" to Blackacre, 46 and she must file because she is
not entitled to the notice-free protection of section 28-05-09.
Equitable liens are another class of interests in realty which,
when foreciosed, may "affect the title," but which are not provided
with the notice-free protection of section 28-05-09. Apparently the
North Dakota Supreme Court has never recognized an equitable
lien, but the remedy is common in other jurisdictions. 47 An
equitable lien, by its nature, is secret, having been created by a
court of equity and not directly by the parties. To the extent that
the courts are ready to enforce a secret lien, even against bona fide
purchasers, 48 they might be ready as well to recognize -a secret
foreclosure action which would bind purchasers pendente lite. On the
other hand, section 28-05-09 is quite explicit in its protection of
secret foreclosure, and the rule of construction inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius49 should apply.
The foreclosure of a lien of public record presents fewer
problems than the foreclosure of the secret liens mentioned above.
For example, a judgment lien, 50 criminal fine and costs lien, 51 and
tax lien 52 must be recorded in order to be enforceable against
44. N.D. CENT. CODE S 35-20-08(3) (1980) ("After judgment in any court of record, the notice
may be given and the lien made effective against the judgment debtor by entering the same in the
judgment docket .... "). The Supreme Court of North Dakota has stated: "The legislature has so
restricted the operation of this entry of notice that only the judgment debtor is affected by it." Clark
v. Sullivan, 3 N.D. 280, 288, 55 N.W. 733, 735 (1893).
45. At least two courts have held that lis pendens notice may not be filed in a suit for attorney's
fees. Hardy v. San Fernando Valley Chamber of Commerce, 99 Cal. App. 2d 572, 222 P.2d 314
(1950); Booker v. Porth, 1 N.C. App. 434, 161 S.E.2d 767 (1968). Neither case, however, involved a
suit to foreclose an attorney's lien, and, in fact, Booker involved no real property at all.
46. See supra note 34.
47. See, e.g., Smith v. Village Ent., Inc., 208 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1973); Peterson v. Swan, 239
Minn. 98, 57 N.W.2d 842 (1953); Schroeder v. Ely, 161 Neb. 252, 73 N,W.2d 165 (1955).
48. See, e.g., I.F.C. Collateral Corp. v. Commercial Units, Inc., 51 Wis. 2d 41, 186 N.W.2d
214(1971).
49. Literally, the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the others. See Curtis v. Oregon State
Correctional Inst., 20 Ore. App. 530, 535, 532 P.2d 798, 800 (1975): see also BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIONARY 601 (3d. ed. 1969).
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-20-13 (1974).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-22 (Supp. 1979).
52. 26 U.S.C. 5 6321 (1976) (creating the federal tax lien). Section 6323(f) of the United States
Code contains the filing requirements, which generally incorporate state law. See also 31 U.S.C. § 191
(1976) (federal priority).
North Dakota law creates several distinct tax liens, some with recording requirements. See, e.g.,
N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-39.2-13 (Supp. 1979) (sales tax lien); § 57-40.2-16 (1972) (use tax lien); § 57-
22-21 (1972) (personal property taxes made a lien on real estate); § 57-38-49 (Supp. 1979) (income
tax lien).
Other tax liens are not specially recorded. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-41 (Supp. 1979)
(general property assessment lien); § 57-35-16 (1972) (bank tax lien): § 57-35.1-08 (1972) (building
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realty. Thus, with respect to these liens, a potential purchaser
pendente lite is at least on notice of the existence of the lien, even if
the purchaser is ignorant of the foreclosure suit. In these
circumstances a court might reasonably conclude that the
purchaser, subordinate to the lienor, is bound by the results of the
secret foreclosure.
Some actions, even though they involve real property
questions, do not affect- the title to the property, and thus section
28-05-07 would not apply. For example, suits in trespass, 53 forcible
detainer, 54 waste,5 5 and others,5 6 while being primarily concerned
with property rights, do not affect the title to the property.
Recovery in such suits is against the defendant personally 57 and not
against the land, and a purchaser pendente lite will take title
unencumbered by the outcome of the litigation.
In conclusion, then, there are three types of actions which
and loan association tax lien); § 57-60-10 (Supp. 1979) (coal conversion facility privilege lax litln): §
57-61-06 (Supp. 1979) (coal severance tax lien);15 57-51-11, -18 (1972) (oil and gas gross production
tax lien); S 57-06-22 (1972) (public utilities tax lien). Generally, ihcse liens are given statulory
priority. See, e.g., § 57-35-16 (1972) (bank tax lien is "prior"): § 57-61-06 (Supp. 1979) (co;il
severance tax lien is "first and paramount").
53. With a few exceptions having to do mainly with trespassing livestock. N.D. CENT. Col- ch.
36-1 (1980), and trespassing on school lands, N.D. CENT. CODi §§ 15-08-20 to -24 (1971 & Supp.
1977), trespass to land is not (]alt with statutorily in North Dakota. The cnises are clear, however,
that trespass is an intentional tort, McDermott v. Sway, 78 N.D. 521, 50 N.W.2(1 235 (1951), and
damages are the appropriate remedy. Cf Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1954). Hence
the title to real property is not affected, and filing under section 28-05-07 would be inappro>lria c.
ILikewise, even if the common-law doctrine off is pendens were in for(-( in North I )akola, s
.supra notes 1-23 and accompanying text. trespass was not an action which invokedI hc 'tn0ntl0-law
doctrine. Tavolacci v. Valentine Ent., .34 Misc. 2d 775, 223 N.Y.S.2(1630 (1961).
54. This action, called "Forcible Entry anti Detainer" or F.E.I). elseiwhcr, is si fol rth inl tIle
Century Code as an action in county justice court. N .D. CEN'r. Coo-: §33-06-01 (1976)..Jristlie'iicm
is now in the county courts of increased i' risdition. KolliIg v. ; (((I 1ar Tire & Ruh(r Co 272
N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1978). The essence of thc actiin is its sumnlarv nature, and (he static iakes it
clear tha it may be brought only "to recover the possession ' (rIal csallc." N.. C I. N. CODE § 33-
06-01 (1976). '"To recover the possession" is not "to affect the titl'," (nd lis pendcins filing should
not be allolwed.
Theoretically at least, other actions to recover possession should be dealt with similarly. As
noted supra no(te 26. however, an action in ejettment to recover l)p0sscssion iraditionally requiIres the'
plaintiff to prove his title, and therefor(, would support the filing l'thc lis 11cn l'ns noti(c.
55. The owner of a life estate is prevented from committing waste. N.I). Cl-SI. Coiw.§ 47-02-34
(1978). and an action to recover damages for waste would not affei' the title' and wold not he ml
occasion for the filing of Iis pendens. Note, however, (hat damages fi waste nv !bc recov,'ered in al
action to quiet title, N.D. CENr. ConrE § 32-17-02 (1976), an action previously "i1n Io iprmi ti
filingoflis pendens, see supra note 26.
56. For example, an action seeking a declaration hill an undertaking involving real prlcry is :i
joint venture does not affect the title. General Prop. Corp. v. )iamond. 29 A. D.2d 173, 2116
N.Y.S.2d 553 (1968). An action seeking recision of the transfer of stock also does not affecl the title.
Courtney Corp. v. Demarest, __ la. App. -, 379 So. 2( 812 (1980). See a/io California Coastal
Comm. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 3d 136, 163 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980).
57. It is true, of course, that the land may he made liable for the judgment Iv filing notice (If the
jiudgment. thereby creating a judgment lien. See N .D. CENT. CooE. § 28-20-13 (1974). The existence
(If such a post-iudgment remedy, however. should not be permittcI to support the filing oi' a Iis
pendens notice. for the action itself does not affect the tite to the property. Likewise lis pendiens filing
should not he alhlowed in an in rem action on the theory that the lis pcndens itself makes the action
affect the tille. The circularity Is'such an argument is clear. Cf McKenzie County v. Casady. 55
N.D. 475. 484. 214 N.W. 461. 465 (1927). in which the court stated (hit "lilt is well s-ttled that the
notice of lis p-ndens does not of itself create in the party recording it anv lien or inte'rest in the
property.
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determine the use and effect of lis pendens: (1) for those actions in
which the title to realty is not affected, notice of lis pendens may not
be filed, and, assuming the non-viability of the common-law
doctrine, the pendente lite purchaser is not bound; (2) for those
actions in which title to real estate is affected, lis pendents may be
filed, and, in fact, must be filed if pendente lite purchasers are to be
bound; and, (3) those actions which affect title to realty but to
which pendente lite purchasers will be bound without the filing of
notice of the litigation.
B. WHAT PROPERTY?
Section 28-05-07 speaks of "real property." While the
distinction between real and personal property is sometimes rather
fine, in most cases the classification of the property will not cause
undue difficulty. There has been some litigation, however, worthy
of discussion.
A leasehold in realty has traditionally been viewed as a
"chattel real," and, while it is an interest in realty, it is not real
property itself. 58 Most courts which have addressed the issue have
held that lis pendens filing is appropriate in a suit involving a
leasehold. 59 The statutes involved in the cases so holding, however,
are distinguishable from North Dakota's. For example, the
California statute allows lis pendens in "an action concerning real
property or affecting the title or the right of possession of real
property. " 60 The California Supreme Court has noted, in Parker v.
Superior Court, 61  that, while "a leasehold is, in a [sic]
contemplation of law, personal property," ' 62 it is, nonetheless, an
estate in land, and a suit involving a leasehold "affect[s] the right of
possession of real property." '6 3 Whether the court would have
reached the same decision had the California statute, like North
Dakota's, not mentioned possession is not known. Other cases may
be similarly distinguished.
6 4
58. Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy. 160 Neb. 320. 70 N.W.2d 382 (1955). aff'd, 351
U.S. 253 (1956).
59. See, e.g., North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326, 331 (D.D.C. 1979); Parker v.
SuperiorCourt, 9 Cal. App. 3d 397. 88 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970). Seealvo 67 A 1. R.3d 747 (1975).
60. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409 (West 1973).
61. 9 Cal. App. 3d 397. 88 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970).
62. Id. at _ 88 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
63. Id. at . 88 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
64. See, e.g., Ruck v. Lange, 17 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 303 (1877): L.awler v. l)ensmore-Compton Bldg.
Co., 60 Misc. 555. 112 N.Y.S. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1908), qff'd, 133 A.D. 896. 118 N.Y.S. 1120 (1909).
Both of these cases held lis pendens appropriate in a suit involving a leasehold under the New York
statute, which allowed notice to be filed when title to, possession, useor enjoyment of real estate was
affected. 60 Misc. at __, 112 N.Y.S. at 436.
A Louisiana statute accords the owners of mineral leases the benefits of 'the laws of the state
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A case which suggests that a notice of lis pendens might
properly be filed under the North Dakota statute in a suit affecting
a leasehold is Suess v. Stapp,65 a decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applying Illinois law. Plaintiffs
sought to rescind a contract of sale of oil leases and to impose a
constructive trust on the proceeds of the oil purchased under the
leases. They sued the Stapps and others under the Federal
Securities Act, alleging fraudulent inducement to invest, and
simultaneously filed notice of lis pendens in the place and manner
required by Illinois law. The Court of Appeals, construing the
Illinois lis pendens statute as not limited to real estate, found the
filing of notice proper. 66 Because the North Dakota statute is clearly
limited to real estate, the holding in Suess is not directly applicable
in this state. In dicta, however, the Suess court stated:
We think ... that plaintiffs' suit has ... an effect on
real property. True, the suit does not directly affect the
leasehold estate. But plaintiffs' suit seeks a constructive
trust on proceeds from an oil lease. When income from an
estate in the hands of third persons may be subjected to a
trust, the estate is affected indirectly.
67
It is therefore arguable that a suit involving a leasehold affects the
title to real property.
A North Dakota court, when presented with a question
involving the applicability of section 28-05-07 to a suit involving a
leasehold, thus has several options: (1) the court might decide
that the statute is inapplicable because a suit involving a leasehold
does not affect the title to realty, and that the plaintiff is therefore
unable to bind pendente lite assignees6 of the lease; (2) the court
applicable to realty. The Louisiana lis pendens statute is one of those laws, and hence is available in
litigation involving oil leaseholds. Ingolia v. lobrano. 244 la. 241, 152 So. 2d 7 (1963): cf Mohawk
Oil Co. v. Layne. 270 F. 841 (D. La. 1921) (dicta).
65. 407 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1969).
66. Suess v. Stapp, 407 F.2d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 1969) (citing People ex rel. Baker v. Wilson, 39
Ill. App. 2d 443, 189 N.E.2d 1 (1963), and McCauley v. Rogers. 10 Il1. App. 559 (1882)). The
Illinois statute applies to "Ielvery condemnation proceeding, suit in equity, proceeding to sell real
estate of decedent to pay debts, or other suit in the nature of suits in equity, affecting or involving
real property." Itt. REV. STAT. ch. 22, § 53 (1967).
67. 407 F.2d at 665. In Illinois, apparently, oil and gas leases are freeholds. Fowley v. Branden,
4 Ill. 2d 355, 122 N.E.2d 559 (1954).
68. This discussion deals with a pendente lite assignee of a lease. A pendente lite purchaser of the
property which is held subject to the lease presents somewhat different problems. The clear
implication of section 47-19-01 of the Century Code is that leases of real property are entitled to be
recorded. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-19-01 (1978). If not recorded, the lease is void as against
subsequent good faith purchasers for value of the property subject to the lease, if the purchase is
recorded. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-41 (1978). Cf Hunt Trust Estate v. Kiker 269 N.W.2d 377
(N.D. 1978) (purchaser took subject to a prior unrecorded lease by failing to make prudent inquiry).
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might decide that section 28-05-07 does not allow or require a
litigant in a suit involving a leasehold to file a notice of lis pendens,
but that the common-law doctrine binds the pendente lite purchaser
to the results of litigation; 69 or, (3) the court might read section 28-
05-07 broadly 70 to find that a suit involving a leasehold "affect[s]
the title to real property," and that a litigant gains the protection of
the statutory doctrine only by filing the notice.
Of these three options, the first is probably most faithful to the
plain language of the North Dakota Century Code, both in section
28-05-07 and in abolishing the common law. The third option
apparently leads to the fairest result to all parties concerned, but
perhaps should be accomplished by legislative rather than court
action. 71 The second option is the only really bothersome choice. It
binds a pendente lite assignee to the results of a secret action on the
lease, in the face of a recording system which stands ready to put
such assignees on constructive notice of the action. Furthermore,
only the most superficial reading of section 28-05-07 would support
this option. Its adoption would therefore be most inappropriate.
72
C. THE OPERATION OF THE NOTICE OF Lis PENDENS
The lis pendens statute contains several technical
requirements regarding the recording and removal of the lis
pendens notice. The notice of lis pendens is filed with the registerof
deeds in the county or counties in which the real property is
situated. 73 The date of filing is the critical date when determining
the priority of rights in the realty. The statute equates filing with
''constructive notice," and hence it should be clear that failure to
file will not affect the rights of a purchaser with actual notice or
knowledge of the litigation.7 4 The notice expires ten years after
Hence, the law protects purchasers against secret leases. That being the case, it seems reasonable
that the law should also protect purchasers pendente lite against secret legal proceedings concerning the
lease.
69. The common-law doctrine was discussed supra at notes 1-23 and accompanying text.
70. See Suess v. Stapp, 407 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1969), and note 66, supra.
71. Section 409 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, for example, reaches actions affecting
"the right of possession of real property." CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE 5 409 (West Supp. 1979). These
words were added in order to assure that lis pendens was available in suits for eiectment, See Parker
v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d at __, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 354 n.1. As noted supra note 26, such a
change should not be necessary in North Dakota to reach ejectment suits, but it may aid in extending
the application of the statute to leaseholds.
72. The foregoing discussion, while written in terms of leaseholds, would probably apply to
other interests in real property which are less than freeholds, such as easements, profits, and licenses.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (1974).
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (1974). This is a statutory exception to rule 5(d)(l) of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that all "papers" in a civil action are to be
filed with the clerk ofcourt. N.D.R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1).
74. Cf Hunt Trust Estate v. Kiker, 269 N.W.2d 377 (N.D. 1978).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
filing, unless renewed. 7 5
The order in which the various filings must occur is as follows:
The action is commenced by the filing of a summons. 76 The
complaint may be filed simultaneously or thereafter. 77 After the
filing of the complaint, the notice of lis pendens may be filed.
78
Within sixty days of the filing of the lis pendens notice, the
summons must be published or served, or the notice shall be "of no
avail. ,79 Notice may be filed by the defendant if the answer alleges
a counterclaim which affects the title to real estate and demands
substantive relief.
80
The lis pendens statute requires that the notice contain "the
names of the parties, the object of the action and a description of
the property affected. "81 That this section will be construed with
technical precision is evidenced by an early North Dakota case,
Buxton v. Sargent.82 There Charles Kindred conveyed the property in
question to Thompson in 1885, and Thompson conveyed it to
Sarah Kindred five days later. In 1888 Sarah Kindred conveyed to
Buxton. In 1889, Paine sued Charles Kindred and Sargent to
enforce a vendor's lien, and recorded lis pendens naming those two
parties. This lis pendens was found to be ineffective to bind Buxton
to the results of the prior lawsuit, because the person from whom he
had purchased (Sarah Kindred) was not a party to the prior action
and was not named in the lis pendens notice.83
Similarly, the property against which the lis pendens notice is
filed must be described with particularity. Most of the litigation
dealing with the adequacy of the description of the property arises
from the requirement that specific property be at issue in the
litigation and described in the pleadings. Although courts
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07.1 (1974).
76.N.D.R. Civ, P. 3.
77. N.D.R. CIrv. P. 4(c) (2).
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (1974). See Plott v. Kittelson, 58 N.D. 881, 228 N.W. 217
(1929). Because the complaint and the notice of lis pendens must be filed in different offices, it is
likely that they will never be filed simultaneously, although the statute permits it.
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (1974).
80. Id. Thus, the enumeration of defenses in the answer apparently will not, in itself, support
the filing oflis pendens.
81. Id.
82.7 N.D. 503, 75 N.W. 811 (1898).
83. Buxton v. Sargent, 7 N.D. 503, 505-09, 75 N.W. 811,812-13 (1898). The court noted:
A purchaser pendente lite must know whether his grantor's rights are involved in
litigation, but he need not inquire whether strangers are struggling among themselves
about the same property. . . . It is true that the plaintiff in the action to enforce the
vendor's lien did, in fact, file a notice of lis pendens. But this notice was not sufficient
to affect the plaintiff, because it did not contain as a party defendant the name of the
person from whom plaintiff purchased, and who was, when the notice was filed, the
owner of the property according to the public records'and in fact.
Id. at 507-08, 75 N.W. at 812.
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occasionally are lenient in applying this requirement,8 4 generally
the requirement must be strictly met.85
The lis pendens notice may be cancelled in one of three ways:
(1) by entry of judgment when the time for appeal has run;
(2) by written request by the party originally filing the notice;
or, (3) upon application by "any person aggrieved" after a
showing of good cause.8 6 There are apparently no North Dakota
cases construing these cancellation procedures, but much of the lis
pendens law of other states has been set out in cases involving
attempts to expunge a lis pendens notice from the record.
For example, in Parker v. Superior Court,87 Dwight had sued his
wife for divorce, alleging, inter alia, breach of a property settlement
agreement, the res of which was a leasehold interest in realty. After
Dwight had filed a notice of lis pendens, Parker bought the
property. In order to test the propriety of filing lis pendens with
respect to a leasehold, 88 Parker moved in superior court89 to
expunge the lis pendens. When that motion was denied, Parker
sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to remove the
lis pendens. 90 Such a procedure should be available in North
Dakota. 91
The desire to expunge a lis pendens filing might, as well,
support an action to quiet title. 92 A lis pendens notice clearly places
84. See, e.g., Bowles v. Middleton Collateral Loan Co., 71 Ohio Op. 2d 110. 328 N.E.2d 821
(1974). The court accepted the description of the property in the complaint, rather than in the
prevailing party's counterclaim. The standard used by the court was that the description must be
"sufficient" and "specific." Id. at Ill, 328N.E.2dat822.
85.. See, e.g., Weisinger v. Berfond, 19 Misc. 2d 526, 185 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1959), where the
description "Lot 24 and environs" did not extend to lot 49. See also Lake Louise Marie Community
Ass'n v. Lake Louise Marie Corp., 25 A.D.2d 475, 266 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1966).
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-08 (1974).
87. 9 Cal. App. 3d 497, 88 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970).
88. Lis pendens and leaseholds are discussed supra at notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
89. This motion would have been in the context of the divorce action.
90. The writ was denied on the merits. 9 Cal. App. 3d at 400, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
91. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-08 (1974) (cancellation oflis pendens); N.D. CENT. CODE ch.
32-34 (1976) (writ of mandamus). See also F.C.Y. Constr. & Equip. Co. v. Superior Court, 24 Ariz.
App. 596, 540 P.2d 722 (1975). Prohibition, the negative counterpart to mandamus, should be
available to block an order cancelling lis pendens. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-35 (1976) (writ of
prohibition).
A related question is whether an order granting or denying a motion to cancel lis pendens is
appealable. The question has not been answered in North Dakota. but the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, construing a statute substantially similar to section 28-27-02(3) of the North Dakota
Century Code (allowing supreme court review of "[aln order which grants. refuses, continues, or
modifies a provisional remedy"), found an order cancelling a notice of lis pendens appealable.
Rehnberg v. Minnesota Homes, 235 Minn. 558, 49 N.W.2d 196 (1951): accord, Ratich v. Scalo, 165
Conn. 675, 345 A.2d 26 (1974) (sub silentio); DeMapia v. Equitable Dev. Co., 302 So. 2d 418 (Fla.
1974) (sub silentio); cf. Hill v. L/A Management Corp., 234 Ga. 341, 216 S.E.2d 97 (1975) (allowing
certification of the question to the appellate court). Such orders have been held appealable in federal
court. Suess v. Stapp, 407 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1969).
92. See N.D. CENr. CODE ch. 32-17 (1974). The use of quiet title to remove the notice of lis
pendens should be distinguished from the common use of quiet title actions to test the efficacy of the
notice following the completion of the prior litigation. See, e.g., Buxton v. Sargent, 7 N.D. 503. 75
N.W. 811 (1898).
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a cloud on the title to the property,9 3 but whether that cloud is
sufficiently burdensome to be called "[an] interest in, or lien or
encumbrance upon" realty is not answered by the statute itself.
Apparently no court has answered these questions directly, and it is
unlikely that any court will, because statutory removal, or, in the
alternative, mandamus, provides remedies more precisely suited to
the removal of the notice. 94
D. THE EFFECT OF FILING THE NOTICE OF Lis PENDENS
1. Persons affected
The filing of lis pendens gives constructive notice of the lawsuit
to a "purchaser or encumbrancer. ' ' 95 "Purchaser" includes a
private buyer, 96 a purchaser at a judicial sale, 97 tax sale, 98 mortgage
or lien foreclosure sale, 99 or bankruptcy sale, °00 a purchaser under
contract for deed,' 0 and a lessee.102 "Encumbrancer" includes a
93. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.84, at 816 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
94. Another procedure, available in some states, and which commends itself to North Dakota
lawmakers, allows the property owner to have the notice oflis pendens removed upon the posting of a
bond. See, e.g., Steward Dev. Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 266, 166 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1980), in which the California Court of Appeals carefully examined the interplay between such an
expungement statute, CAL. Civ. PROC. ConE S 409.2 (West Supp. 1979), and the remedy of specific
performance. See also Weisinger v. Berfond, 19 Misc. 2d 526, 185 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1959); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 6515 (McKinney Supp. 1979). Cf N.D. CENT. CODES §32-08.1 -01 to -14 (Supp. 1979)
(attached property may be released upon the posting ofa bond); N.D. CFNT. CODE § 32-09-3 (1976)
(discharge of garnishment upon undertaking by defendant).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (1974).
96. See Bateman v. Backus, 4 Dak. 433, 34 N.W. 66 (1887).
97. See First State Bank v. Cunningham, 103 Ind. App. 310, 7 N.E.2d 537 (1937): Harris
Realty Co. v. Austin, 134 Tex. 484. 137 S.W.2d 19 (1940) (dicta).
98. See Industrial Bank v. Tobriner, 405 F.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Baker v. West, 120 Tex.
113, 36 S.W.2d 695 (1931) (dicta).
Of course, the requirement that a purchaser pendente lite is bound by the results of the litigation
only if the purchase is from a party to the litigation, see supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text,
applies here as well. Because the vendor at a tax sale is the taxing authority, is pendens should apply
only when the litigation involves that authority. See FREEMAN, supra note 2, at § 529: Coffin v. Old
Line Life Ins. Co., 138 Neb. 857, 295 N.W. 884 (1941). This was exactly the case in Tobriner, in
which plaintiffBank sought to enjoin the Commissioners of the District of Columbia and others from
issuing a tax.deed. The court held that, "as both parties agreed . .., the doctrine of lis pendens
protects appellant's rights from loss or impairment by a conveyance of the property by appellee."
405 F.2d at 1323 n.6 (citations omitted).
99. See Alsup v. Southern Mfg. Co., 244 Ala. 330, 13 So. 2d 408 (1943); Eharbo v. Stacey, 16
La. App. 248, 133 So. 793 (1931). Compare Gehlert v. Smiley, 114 S.W.2d 1029, 1035 (Mo. 1938)
("Lis pendens filed after the right to foreclose had accrued could not affect that right or title obtained
thereunder. ").
100. See Kilpatrick v. Buhlig, 294 111. App. 304, 13 N.E.2d 799 (1938).
101. See McKenzie County v. Casady, 55 N.D. 475, 214 N.W. 461 (1927). In Casady, the
county sought to have the real property in question declared to be Casady's, and hence amenable to
attachment pursuant to the county's previously obtained money judgment. Casady was purchasing
the property tinder a contract for deed when the notice of lis pendens was filed. Casady had
performed under the contract, received the deeds, and delivered them to a third party when the
second suit was brought. The court held that "plaintiff [was] entitled to have the nature and exteni of
the interest of its debtor in and to the property in question ascertained and determined." Id. at 488,
214 N.W. at 467.
But compare FREEMAN, supra note 2, at § 531:
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mortgagee, 103  a mortgagee in a trust deed, 10 4  a mechanic's
lienor, 0 5  and other statutory lienors.1 0 6  The purchaser or
encumbrancer must have dealt with a party to the litigation,107 or
with one in priority therewith. 0 8 In a sequence of purchases
emanating from a litigant, the lis pendens filing probably binds not
only the first purchaser but all subsequent'purchasers, 09 although
there is authority to the contrary. 11 0
2. How those persons are affected
The North Dakota lis pendens statute apparently provides
clear guidance to the operative effect of the notice:
[11 From the time of filing only shall the pendency of the
action be constructive notice to a purchaser or
If the owner of land has entered into a contract for its sale, whereby the purchaser has
become vested with an equity entitling him to a conveyance, [the purchaseri is not
regarded as a purchaser pendente lite as to any suits subsequently commenced, and a
conveyance made to him, though during the pendency of such a suit, is not subject to
the judgment therein.
Id. at 1136 (citing Rooney v. Michael, 84 Ala. 585, 4 So. 421 (1888); Franklin Savings Bank v.
Taylor, 131 I1. 376, 23 N.E. 397 (1890)). Seealso Parks v. Jackson, II Wend. 442 (N.Y. 1833). This
rule ought to apply most specifically to a non-installment contract to sell realty. See, e.g., Meyering v.
Russell, 53 Mich. App. 695, 220 N.W.2d 121, rev'd on other grounds, 393 Mich. 770, 224 N.W.2d 280
(1974). In Meyering, the court stated:
Although the decisions are not unanimous, the prevailing rule is that a third-party
purchaser who takes title under an executory contract made prior to the filing of a lis
pendens is protected even though the deed is executed after the suit is started or the lis
pendens is filed. This doctrine is often subject to exceptions where the third party
purchaser is (1) made a party to the suit before rendition of judgment, or (2) has
knowledge of the adverse claim at the time of signing the executory contract, or (3) has
paid only a portion of the purchase price before the lis pendens is filed. Of the
exceptions, the most important is the requisite that the third-party purchaser has no
knowledge of the adverse claim.
53 Mich. App. at __ , 220 N.W.2d at 125 (citations omitted).
It should be clear, of course, that the vendee is bound by the eventual .judgment if the contract is
entered into following the filing of the notice oflis pendens.
102. See Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177 (1885).
103. See, e.g., Imperial Farming Co. v. Van Horn, 107 Cal. App. 717, 290 P. 1077 (1930);
Chatham Chem. Co. v. Vidalia Chem. Co., 163 Ga. 276, 136 S.E. 62 (1926); Carver v. Ketchum,
53 Idaho 595, 26 P.2d 139 (1933).
104. See Fanin Bank v. Blystone, 417 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967); People ex rel. O'Connor
v. Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 504, 20 N.E.2d 306 (1939).
105. See Lakeville Mfg. Co. v. Herman Homes, Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 798, 215 N.Y.S.2d 553
(1961). Seealso FREEMAN, supra note 2, § 526, at 1129-30, and cases cited at 1130 n. 6.
106. See Waggonerv. Oliver, 256 S.W. 302 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
107. FREEMAN, supra note 2, § 526, at 1128. In Bryan v. Jackson, 178 Va. 123, 16 S.E.2d 366
(1941), a husband conveyed pr9perty to his wife, who conveyed for value to a third party during the
four month preference period prior to commencement of the husband's bankruptcy case. The court
held that the third party acquired good title to the property, notwithstanding the preferential nature
of the initial transfer. Id. at __, 16 S.E.2d at 369. See also Harris Realty Co. v. Austin, 134 Tex.
484, 137 S.W.2d 19(1940).
108. See Weberv. Kemper, 320 111. 11, 150 N.E. 339 (1926).
109. See Freeman, supra note 2, at § 527, and authorities cited at 1132 n. 17.
110. See French v. Successors of the Loyal Co., 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 627 (1834).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, and [2]
every person whose conveyance or encumbrance is
subsequently executed or subsequently recorded shall be
deemed a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer with
notice and [3] shall be bound by all proceedings taken
after the filing of such notice to the same extent as if he
were a party to the action. 1II
Clause [1] serves to abolish the common-law doctrine and
replace it with this statutory scheme.11 2 The reference to the
"pendency" of the action limits the duration of the filing. 1 13 Clause
[2] has little effect, as it does not explain what happens to a
subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer "with notice" of the
pendency of the action. It is clause [3] which is the substantive
provision of the quoted portion of the statute. That clause makes it
clear that the filing of the notice of lis pendens does not create a lien
on the property,' 14 and does not automatically bind a late recorder
to the results of a lawsuit commenced prior to recording.
For example, in Bateman v. Backus,' 15 Clark conveyed to
Backus on October 20, Bateman sued Clark on October 22, filing
lis pendens notice the same day, and Backus recorded-his deed on
October 24. The Supreme Court of Dakota Territory stated that
"it would be impossible to claim that a lis pendens could give a
creditor under an attachment [Bateman] a lien superior to the title
of a purchaser under an unrecorded conveyance [Backus] .... Had
[Bateman] made [Backus a party] to the action [against Clark], his
attachment proceedings would, of course, have been nugatory."116
Bateman remains the law in North Dakota. 11 7
Bateman should be contrasted with J. & S. Corp. v. Mortgage
Associates, Inc.,118 a 1969 Wisconsin case. Mortgage Associates
sought to foreclose a first mortgage from Cherry Wood Village. Lis
pendens was filed in this action in April of 1966. The action
111. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-05-07 (1974) (bracketed material added).
112. Id. This is indicated by the language "[firom the time of filing only." Id. (emphasis added).
See the discussion of the common-law doctrine supra at notes 1-23 and accompanying text. Section
28-05-07 also mentions "constructive notice," indicating that actual notice of the suit by a purchaser
or encumbrancer will take the case outside the statute. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-05-07 (1974). Courts
should have little difficulty binding purchasers with actual notice to the results of the suit. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 90(l) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
113. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
114. McKenzie County v. Casady, 55 N.D. 475, 486, 214 N.W. 461, 465 (1927).
115.4 Dak. 433, 34 N.W. 66 (1887).
116. Bateman v. Backus, 4 Dak. 433, 436-37, 34 N.W. 66, 68 (1887) (quoting Lamont v.
Chesire, 65 N.Y. 30 (1875)).
117. See McKenzie County v. Casady, 55 N.D. 475, 485, 214 N.W. 461. 465 (1927). and cases
cited therein.
118.41 Wis. 2d418, 164 N.W.2d 221 (1969).
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succeeded, the mortgage was foreclosed, and Mortgage Associates
bought the property in question at the sheriff's sale. J. & S. Cor-
poration had apparently become a second mortgagee in February,
before the lis pendens was filed, and subsequently sought to
foreclose the second mortgage and redeem the property, unaffected
by the result in the earlier lawsuit. It is unclear if J. & S. ever
recorded, but it apparently did not do so before lis pendens was
filed in April. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the
granting of summary judgment for Mortgage Associates.
119
Relying heavily on an early Nebraska case, 120 the court concluded
that "the plain meaning of [the Wisconsin lis pendens statute21 ] is
to relegate the holder of an unrecorded interest in land to the status
of the subsequent purchaser, whose rights are subject to the legal
proceedings in which the lis pendens is filed." 1
22
It is difficult to reconcile Bateman with J. & S. Corp. The
emphasis in the Bateman analysis is on the words "to the same
extent as if he were a party to the action.' 1 23 Applying the law
literally, the court hypothesized that Backus was a party to the
earlier suit between Bateman and Clark, and found that Bateman
had no cause of action against Backus and that Backus's property
was not liable for Clark's debts, even though Backus had not
recorded his deed.' 24 On the other hand, the emphasis in]. & S.
Corp. was on the legislative rationale behind the statute, and
the unfairness of allowing secret conveyances or liens to be superior
to the rights of the litigants. 1
25
As one commentator has noted, 26 the effect of the lis pendens
119. J. & S. Corp. v. Mortgage Assocs., Inc.. 41 Wis. 2d 418. 426, 164 N.W.2d 221, 222-25
(1969).
120. Mungerv. T.J. Beard & Bros.. 79 Neb. 764, 113 N.W. 214(1907).
121. The Wisconsin statute is substantially the same as section 28-05-07 of the North Dakota
Century Code:
From the time of such filing every purchaser or encumbrancer whose conveyance
or encumbrance is not recorded or filed shall be deemed a subsequent purchaser or en-
cumbrancer and shall be bound by the proceedings in the action to the same extent
and in the same manner as if he were a party thereto.
41 Wis. 2d at 422, 164 N.W.2d at 223 (quoting section 281.03(l) of Wisconsin Statutes. which is
currently codified at Wts. STAT. ANN. § 840.10 (West 1977)).
122. 41 Wis. 2d at 423, 164 N.W.2d at 223.
123. 4 Dak. at 436-37, 34 N.W. at 68.
124. Id. at 437, 34 N.W. at 68. The court stated:
As soon as the whole [hypothetical l case had been disclosed, it would have ap-
peared that [Bateman] was making a claim against a person [Backusi who was in no
respect liable to him, and his complaint would have been dismissed. How can he. un-
der the statute, have any greater claim by omitting him? The words, "to the same ex-
tent as if he was [sic] a party to the action," cannot be omitted in the construction.
Id. (quoting Lamont v. Cheshire, 65 N.Y. 30 (1875)). The North Dakota ]is pendens statute was
derived from section 132 of Wait's New York Code. See N.D. CENT. COnE § 28-05-07 (1974).
125. 41 Wis. 2d at 423-26, 164 N.W.2d at 223-25.
126. FREEMAN, supra note 2, at § 530.
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statute on a properly conveyed but unrecorded deed depends upon
the interplay between the lis pendens statute and the state's real
property recording statute.1 27 When a state has a recording statute
which makes unrecorded deeds ineffective against persons without
notice, a lis pendens statute such as North Dakota's would lead to a
result similar to that in]. &S. Corp. 128 In a so-called "race-notice"
state, such as North Dakota, where an unrecorded conveyance is
valid except against subsequent purchasers who record first,1 29 the
North Dakota lis pendens statute leads to the result in Bateman.
Another problem relating to the effect of the lis pendens filing
is the relation between the filing litigant and the federal
government as a tax lienor. Atlas, Inc. v. United States130 is.a recent,
well-reasoned decision of the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota. In Atlas, Dohn had engaged in a three-
year-long embezzlement of the money of Atlas. Atlas brought an
action in state court against Dohn to recover the nearly $400,000
embezzled, and to impose a constructive trust on Dohn's home,
which had been purchased partly with the embezzled funds. Lis
pendens was filed on October 12, 1975. The United States assessed
a tax liability based upon Dohn's unsavory income, and filed notice
of its tax lien on December 1, 1976.131 The state court entered
judgment for Atlas on February 22, 1977, and the present action
was begun to quiet title to the real property. 132
Atlas argued that its filing of the notice of lis pendens before
the filing of the tax lien gave it priority over the government, 133 but
the court disagreed. i 3  After properly finding that federal rather
than state law applied, the court applied the so-called "choatness"
doctrine to test the sufficiency of Atlas's lis pendens "lien." 35 The
127. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court has agreed with Freeman that the issue is one of
recording statutes rather than lis pendens statutes. After citing Bateman and Lamont as good authority,
the Casady court noted that ''t[he conflict of authorities on this question is more apparent than real:
the differences arising either from the wording of the statute providing for notice of lis pendens or
from the recording statute." McKenzie County v. Casady, 55 N.D. 475, 485, 214 N.W. 461, 465
(1927).
128. See Munger v. T..I. Beard & Bros., 79 Neb. 764, 770, 113 N.W. 214, 217 (1907) (cited in
FREEMAN, supra note 2, at 1134 n.8).
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-41 (1978).
130. 459 F. Supp. 1000 (D.N.D. 1978).
131. Atlas, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D.N.D. 1978). Federal tax lien
recording requirements are found at 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (f) (1976). Generally, they incorporate state
law.
132. 459 F. Supp. at 1001.
133. Id. at 1003. It is clear that embezzled income gives rise to tax liability. Id. at 1002 (citing
james v. U.S., 366 U.S. 213 (1961)). The tax liet, is created in 26 U.S.C. § 6321. Section 6323
subordinates that lien to the rights of certain parties, including "any purchaser, holder of a security
interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor" who gains that status before the notice of the
tax lien is filed. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1976).
134. 459 F. Supp. at 1005.
135. The "choatness" doctrine was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois ex rel.
Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946), with reference to 31 U.S.C. § 191, the general federal
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court concluded that whatever interest was gained by the lis
pendens notice was not "choate" enough to take priority over the
unfiled tax lien. 136 This conclusion is unassailable.
Fortunately, the court did not end its analysis there and let this
logical but inequitable result stand. Having determined that the
tax lien had priority over the judgment lien, the court turned to the
question of the property interest of Dohn to which the tax lien
attached. The court applied state law to find that Dohn had
acquired no interest in the property purchased with Atlas's
embezzled funds, 137 and hence had acquired no property to which
the tax lien could attach. 138 The court concluded that the tax lien
attached prior to Atlas's judgment lien only to that portion of the
realty purchased with Dohn's legitimate income. That portion
purchased with Atlas's funds was encumbered by Atlas's superior
judgment lien. 139
3. Duration of the lis pendens notice
Although the statute speaks in several places of the pendency
of the suit, 140 it is not altogether clear exactly what the life of the lis
pendens notice is. It surely begins with the filing of the notice,
which occurs after the filing of the complaint and summons, but
before the service of the summons. The termination of the
pendency of the suit is defined statutorily as "its final
determination upon appeal or until the time for appeal has passed,
unless judgment is sooner satisfied. 141
There is a division of authority over whether the notice of lis
pendens has any effect following termination of the suit. This
priority section. As stated by the Atlas court, "[for a lien to be sufficiently established to defeat a
federal tax lien, the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien
must be established." 459 F. Supp. at 1003. Courts have tended to add the "choatness"
requirement to the otherwise precisely defined statutory scheme of 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (1976). See
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Globe
Corp., 113 Ariz. 44. 546 P.2d 11 (1976). Butsee86 HARV. L. REv. 1570 (1973).
136. 459 F. Supp. at 1003-04. The requirement that was missing was that the amount of Atlas's
lien was not certain before filing. This requirement will always be missing in a pre-judgment lis
pendens filing. Id.
137. Id. at 1004, 1005. The court cited Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960), and
United States v. Durham Lumber Co.. 363 U.S. 522 (1960), as authority to determine that state law
was applicable in this situtation. 459 F. Supp. at 1004. The court then interpreted and applied
section 59-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code and several North Dakota cases dealing with
implied trusts. Id. at 1005.
138. 459 F. Supp. at 1005.
139. Id. This conclusion is consistent with the view that a federal tax lien will be subordinate to a
purchase money lien, regardless of when it arises. See S. RFP. No. 1708. 89th Cong.. 2d Sess. 4.
reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3722. 3724.
140. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-05-07, -10 (1974).
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-10 (1974). The termination ofthe pendency ofa lawssuit involves
issues beyond the scope of this article. See FREEMAN, supra note 2. at § 542.
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question apparently has not been specifically addressed by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota. The answer may lie, however, in
the court's decision in Casey v. Corwin. 142 Corwin obtained a quiet
title judgment against Burleigh County in March. In October, the
county quit-claimed the property to Casey. Casey recorded before
Corwin. In the quiet title action brought by Casey against Corwin,
Corwin prevailed. The court noted:
In the absence of a statute affirmatively and clearly
requiring the recording of judgments, we do not think
that any notice other than that which may be deemed to
be given by the entry of a judgment is essential to bind a
privy of the party against whom the judgment was
entered. 143
The effect of a lis pendens filing was not discussed in Casey, but it
surely would not diminish the strength of Corwin's argument that
his judgment was superior to Casey's purchase.' 44 In fact, the lis
pendens recording should add to the superiority of the judgment.
E. AFFIRMATIVE CHALLENGES TO THE FILING OF A Lis PENDENS
NOTICE
1. Slander to title
Slander to title is a cause of action, recognized in many
states, 45 in which property is damaged by a false and malicious
unprivileged publication. ' 4 6 While the filing of a is pendens notice
has been found to be slanderous to title, 47 the better view, at least
142.71 N.W.2d 553 (N.I). 1955).
143. Casey v. Corwin, 71 N.W.2d 553,557 (N.D. 1955). Section 47-19-02 ofthe North Dakota
Century Code permits judgments "affecting the title to or the possession of real property" to he
recorded. N.D. CENT. Cooy § 47-19-02 (Supp. 1979); cf N.D. CENT Con. § 28-20-13 (1974).
Section 28-20-13 allows only judgments requiring payment of money to be recorded and made liens
on the property of the defendant. In light of section 47-19-02, the problem discussed in the ext may
be less important than it appears, because in the usual course of events the judgment "affecting the
title" will be recorded and made binding before the lis pendens notice expires.
144. See alto FREF.MAN, supra note 2, at § 543. Section 439 of Freeman was cited with approval by
the Casemy court. 71 N.W.2d at 557.
145. See Mink Hollow Dev. Co. v. State, 87Misc. 2d 61, 384 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1976): Shenefield
v. Axtell, 274 Or. 279, 545 P.2d 876 (1976); Schlytter v. Lesperance, 62 Wis. 2d 661, 215 N.W.2d
552 (1974). Some states refer to this action as disparagement of title. See Hill v. Allan, 259 Cal. App.
2d 470. 66 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1968); Witmer v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 223 Iowa 671, 273 N.W. 370 (1937):
Norton v. Kanouff. 165 Neb. 435, 86 N.W.2d 72 (1957). See generally Annot., 39 A.1.R.2d 840
(1955) (recording of instrument purporting to affect title as slander to title).
146. See Briggs v. Coykendale, 57 N.D. 785, 788, 224 N.W. 202, 204 (1929) ("Slander oftitle is
a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or
personal property, and causing him special damages.").
147. See Birch v. Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (1959).
Lis PENDENS
under the North Dakota statutes, 48 is that the publication is
privileged and slander will not lie.
For example, in Albertson v. Raboff 149 Raboff had initially sued
Albertson for a money judgment, seeking also a lien on certain
realty, or, in the alternative, a declaration that the land had been
fraudulently conveyed to Albertson. Raboff recorded notice of lis
pendens in conformity with the California statute.'5 0 Judgment for
Albertson in this initial action was affirmed on appeal. 1 5' Albertson
then brought an action against Raboff, alleging slander to title by
the filing of lis pendens and malicious prosecution by the bringing
of the lawsuit. The trial court dismissed the action. The Supreme
Court of California, in an opinion written by Justice Traynor,
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the malicious prosecution
issue, but agreed that Albertson could not prevail in the slander to
title action.1 52 The court based its decision on the California
privilege statute, which is identical to North Dakota's. Under that
statute, "[a] privileged communication is one made . . . [ijn any
legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other proceeding
authorized by law. '' 3 Applying the statute, .Justice Trhynor
stated:
The disparagement of title arises, therefore, from the
recordation of the notice of lis pendens as well as from the
pleadings. The publication of the pleadings is
unquestionably clothed with absolute privilege, and we
have concluded that the republication thereof by
recording a notice of lispendens is similarly privileged.
... It would be anomalous to hold that a litigant is
privileged to make a publication necessary to bring an
action but that he can be sued for defamation if he lets
anyone know that he has brought it. 154
As noted by Justice Traynor, the privilege is absolute and the
presence of malice is inconsequential. 155
148. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-02-05(1971).
149. 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956).
150. CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 409 (West 1973). The North Dakota and California statutes are
derived from the same source, although they now differ in detail.
151. Raboffv. Albertson, 122 Cal. App. 2d 555, 265 P.2d 139 (1954).
152. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956)..
153. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 47 (West 1954); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-05 (1971). These
statutes state the common-law rule. See Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d at 378. 295 P.2d at 408. See
also Zamarello v. Yale, 514 P.2d 228, 230 n.4 (Alaska 1973).
154. 46 Cal. 2d at 379-80, 295 P.2d at 408-09.
155. Cf McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933) (complaint filed with the
supreme court pursuant to disciplinary proceedings is absolutely privileged). See also Stewart v.
Fahey, 14 Ariz. App. 149, -, 481 P-.2d 519, 521 (1971) (Eubank',J,. specially concurring).
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The court's logical decision in Albertson has been followed in
many jurisdictions. 156 It should be noted that Birch v. Fuller,'57 an
example of lis pendens found to be slanderous, is distinguishable.
In that case a dispute arose between Fuller and Birch as to the use
of certain realty. Fuller filed a lis pendens notice and corresponded
with Birch, claiming he owned the realty and demanding the
payment of money. Birch then sued Fuller for slander to title, and
the court held for Birch.' 5 8 Not only did the court find that Fuller
had no claim to the land and that he had acted with malice, but
most importantly, in terms of the Albertson rationale, that
he had never actually filed his lawsuit. Hence, the filing of lis
pendens was something other than the republication of a privileged
pleading; it was instead a disparagement of the title.
In this vein, it is also noteworthy that the Albertson court found
a cause of action had been stated in malicious prosecution. The
gravamen of this tort is an improperly commenced action, and this
will most likely be an aggrieved party's substantive complaint when
the filing of lis pendens appears to slander title. The two actions are
clearly related, and the existence of the tort of malicious




In the years following the germinal United States Supreme
Court case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 160 and its progeny,1
6 1
This immunity extends to a litigant's attorney. Larmour v. Campanali. 96 Cal. App. 3d 566,
158 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 568 (1977).
156. See Zamarello v. Yale, 514 P.2d 230 (Alaska 1973); Stewart v. Fahey. 14 Ariz. App. 149,
481 P.2d 519 (1971); Berger v. Shea, 150 Ga. App. 812, 258 S.E.2d 621 (1979); Houska v.
Frederick. 447 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. 1969): Hauptman v. Edwards, Inc., 170 Mont. 310. 553 P.2d 975
(1976): Kropp v. Prather, 526 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1975): Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186 (Utah
1976). Cf. Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 572 P.2d 861 (1977): Weiler v. Stern, 67 ill. App. 3d
179. 384 N.E.2d 762 (1978); Nagy v. McBurney. __ R.I. __ 392 A.2d 365 (1978): Huntlev v.
Harberts, 264 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 1978).
But see Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz. App. 149, __ 481 P.2d 519, 521 (1971) (Eubank, .,
specially concurring) (opining that the privilege should not be absolute). but ef Stafiney v. Standard
Oil Co.. 71 N.D. 170. 299 N.W. 582 (1941) (the privilege under section 14-02-05 of the North
Dakota Century Code is absolute and malice has no effect).
157.9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (1959).
158. Birch v. Fuller. 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (1959).
159. A detailed discussion of malicious prosecution is beyond the scope of this article. See
Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375. 382. 295 P.2d 405. 410-12 (1956); Farmers Elevator Co. v.
David. 234 N.W.2d 26, 33-34 (N.D. 1975). See also Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz. App. 149. __ 481
P.2d 519. 523-24 (1971) (Eubank, J.. specially concurring) ("In a slander of title claim, the
proponent must allege and prove publication, malice and falsity and special damages.... In a civil
malicious prosecution claim, the proponent must allege and prove the termination of the prior
proceedings in his favor, lack of probable cause, malice and special damage.").
160. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
161. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co.. 416 U.S. 600 (1974): Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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in which various state prejudgment protection devices were
constitutionally challenged as violations of due process, lis pendens
notice filing schemes have not remained unchallenged. In Batey v.
Digirolamo,162 for example, plaintiffs alleged fraud and certain
statutory violations in the sale of a limited partnership interest in
realty. 163 Lis pendens was duly filed, whereupon defendants moved
to set aside the notice based upon their contention that the Hawaii
statute violated the due process guarantees of the United States
Constitution. The defendants made the predictable arguments:
that the notice of lis pendens clouds their title, and that they and
their property are damaged significantly thereby; that this
"deprivation" is accomplished ex parte, without notice or hearing;
and that, under Sniadach and subsequent cases, the procedure must
be invalidated.1 64 The court disposed of these contentions in short
order. 165 It found that there had been no significant deprivation of
property, distinguishing Sniadach and Fuentes v. Shevin 166 on the
grounds that those plaintiffs had actually been dispossessed of
property, and found that cases involving garnishment were
inapposite,1 67 as were cases dealing with prejudgment real estate
attachment. 168
The court did not base its decision solely upon its finding that
defendants had not been deprived of any property. Rather, the
court looked as well to the state interests advanced by the lis
pendens notice statute and found them to be legitimate,169 stating:
This Court therefore believes that when, as here, the
alleged deprivation cannot fairly be characterized as a
''seizure," when "no more than a private gain is directly
at stake" for defendants ... and especially when legitimate
162. 418 F. Supp. 695 (D. Hawaii 1976). See also Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d
105, 108 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1973); George v. Oakhurst Realty. Inc.. __ R.I. __ 414 A.2d 471
(1980). Cf. Hammersly v. District Court, -, Colo. __, 610 P.2d 94, 96 n 2 (1980).
163. Batev v. Digirolamo, 418 F. Supp. 695, 696 (D. Hawaii 1976). Note that this suit was
brought in federal court and lis pendens was filed under the Hawaii statute, although that statute
makes no mention of the federal court. HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-51 (1976). The court, however.
found that "[tihis section authorizes the recording of a notice of the pendency of an action in a
United States District Court. as well as a state court." 418 F. Supp. at 696 n.l. No authority was
cited for this conclusion.
164. 418 F. Supp. at 6 9 6-97.
165. Id. at 697.
166. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
167. 418 F. Supp. at 697 (discussing and distinguishing Brunswick Corp. v. Galaxy Cocktail
Lounge, Inc., 54 Hawaii 656, 513 P.2d 1390 (1973)). See also North Georgia Finishing. lnc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
168. 418 F. Supp. at 697 (discussing and distinguishing Bay State Harness & Horse Racing &
Breeding Ass'n v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973)).
169. 418 F. Supp. at 697. The state interests discussed were the prevention of the multiplicity of
litigation, the desire for an orderly real property recording system, and the need to prevent the
complication of lawsuits. Id.
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state interests are being advanced by the statute, it cannot
declare that [the statute] denies defendants their due
process guarantees under the federal and state
constitutions. 170
The result in Batey was not unlikely. 171 The question of the
substantiality of the property deprivation, however, arguably
warrants closer examination than that given it by the court. For
example, in M.P.L, Inc. v. McCullough, 172 a recent decision by the
United States District -Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi, that state's ex parte prejudgment procedure to attach
real estate of nonresidents was held unconstitutional. 7 3 Using
language that might well be broad enough to reach a lis pendens
statute, the court rejected the notion that the attachment of realty
does not constitute a significant taking of property. 1
74
The lis pendens procedure and Batey are probably
distinguishable from M.P.L It is clear that in North Dakota the
filing of lis pendens notice does not create a lien, 175 but only
provides notice to potential purchasers. Although this notice is a
cloud on the title, it is the thinnest of possible clouds, and one
recognized at common law long before the enactment of any
statutory scheme. The prejudgment attachment of realty 176 creates
a much more substantial interest, which is transformed into a
valid lien by judgment. Further, lis pendens is limited to actions in
which the property affected is directly at issue. 177 As the United
170. Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 (1972)).
171. See also Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 105, 108 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1973).
172. 463 F. Supp. 887 (N.D, Miss. 1978).
173. M.P.I., Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887, 890-91 nn.3-9 (N.D. Miss. 1978). This is
the so called "chancery attachment." See MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-31-1 to -11 (1972).
174. 463 F. Supp. at 899. "fEincumbering realty during the life of the attachment is a burden
upon the right of alienation, interferes with the ability to obtain necessary financing for the
enjoyment of the property and creates a cloud upon the title and a reflection upon the owner's credit
in the business community." Id.
The court cites a number of cases in accord with its decision. See Terranova v. Avco Fin. Set'.,
Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt. 1975); Bay State Harness & Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v.
P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank,
360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973); Clement v. Four North State St. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933
(D.N.H. 1973). Contra, Central Security Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc.. 371 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
The M.P.I. court's discussion of precedent alone is longer than the entire Batey opinion, and,
while the court's conclusion that possessory and nonpossessory liens are not constitutionally
distinguishable may be challenged, the court certainly did not shortchange the litigants or readers of
the opinion.
175. McKenzie County v. Casady. 55 N.D. 475, 214 N.W. 561 (1927); Boehm v. Long, 43
N.D. 1 172 N.W. 862(1919).
176. See N.D. CENT. CoD. ch. 32-08.1 (Supp. 1979). This chapter was recently revised in
response to Sniadach and its progeny. See Guzman v. Western State Bank. 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.
1975) (holding the chapter's predecessor unconstitutional).
177. In M.P.I. the court remarked that plaintiff's claim was "wholly unrelated to the seized
property." 463 F. Supp. at 899.
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States Supreme Court stated in Lindsey v. Normet, 178 "[wie do not
question here reasonable procedural provisions to safeguard
litigated property . . . if these rules are reasonably tailored to
achieve these ends and if they are uniformly and
nondiscriminatorily applied. "179
IV. CONCLUSION
The statutory scheme allowing and requiring that notice of lis
pendens be filed gives broad and legitimate protection to litigants
suing over specific realty. The statutory filing requirements are
neither burdensome nor cumbersome, and the removal of
protection from those who do not record is justified. The question
of the availability of a lis pendens notice should be a standard and
ordinary concern of the litigating attorney.
178. 4(15 U.S. 56(1972).
179. I.indsev v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56. 78 (1972). See alo Compton %-. Navlor. 392 F. Supp. 575
(N.D. Tex. 1975).

